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Introduction
After a phase of transformation leading to a functioning private sector economy and the separate establishment of a public sector, a period of consolidation for the public sector is needed in new market economies. Estonia comprises a central government and municipalities as the sub-national jurisdictions. 1 In part as a consequence of rather unbalanced regional development, the fiscal capacity gap among municipalities has gradually increased in this country during the last decade.
In Estonia all municipalities have to perform a broad range of functions, even though their fiscal resources are often seriously limited. In order to provide them with better chances in a fierce regional competition process, a more equitable financial endowment appears to be desirable as an initial condition for further local economic development. In addition new task requirements have to be met within the framework of the European Union, which in many cases are related to the minimum provision of infrastructure services for which the municipalities are responsible according to the Estonian constitution. Moreover, this fact bears some conflict potentials because the power to regulate fiscal affairs (concerning e.g. conditional grants and/or the size of the equalization funds for unconditional grants) is mostly in the hands of the central government, while the regulatory competence of the municipalities has remained rather weak. Therefore, among other issues, a well-functioning fiscal equalization system should be developed to encourage the local efforts to achieve fiscal balance, to improve fiscal autonomy and to support the public activities of municipalities. In particular, a more stable and predictable vertical equalization system appears to be urgently necessary in Estonia.
This study primarily aims at dealing with the following research topics:
(1) How has the existing Estonian vertical equalization system developed? What are its regional implications, strengths and weaknesses?
(2) Should the connexity principle and the principle of parallelism be chosen as the basis of reform? This paper is structured as follows. After this introductory part, the first question is tackled in the second section. Information about the characteristics and problems of Estonian fiscal equalization is provided there as well. The application of basic principles as the reform recommendations and results will be discussed in the third section. The final section briefly summarizes the major findings of the paper and discusses the anticipated consequences of the reform and concludes.
Estonian Fiscal Equalization System
In Europe the parliament of a country generally has the obligation to provide the country's municipalities with sufficient financial resources to be used at their discretion within the framework of their powers. In addition, the need to protect financially weak local authorities calls for the fiscal equalization procedures which, however, do not diminish the discretionary powers of local authorities to perform their tasks of selfadministration. In Estonia, local government's responsibility areas are determined by the Local Governments Organization Act (KOKS, RT I 1993, 37, 558 ). Yet, the functions of local governments are not always explicitly described. According to a survey conducted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, local government responsibilities have already been regulated in the mid-1990s by almost 450 different laws and legal acts that had assigned over 400 different tasks. of all municipal revenues also differs from one county to another.
The share of self-revenues (including taxes, sales, rents and interests received) of total municipal revenues also varies considerably in Estonia. For example, its share comprises approximately 80% in Harju County, whereas in South Estonia the share has remained at the 41 to 43% level. In most counties, the share makes up 50 to 55% of their total revenues. The regional dispersion of municipal income tax and the dispersion of total tax revenue (per inhabitant) decreased over time, while, the regional dispersion of self-revenue receipts grew slightly (see Table 1 ).
3 Until 2002, 56% of all income tax collected was given to the municipalities and 44% to the central government. During last years, the major tax policy objective was to reduce direct taxes and replace them by indirect taxes in Estonia. The personal income tax rate has been gradually reduced from 26% to 21% (from 2004 to 2009). Consequently the municipal share of income tax amounted to 11.4% of gross income in 2004, while the share grew to 11.9% in 2009. All tax allowances, e.g. for interest rates, costs for education and private retirement savings, are made from the central government's portion of income tax, which was 14.6% of gross income in 2004 and 9.1% in 2009. Because of the fiscal problems related to the central government budget the reduction of personal income tax rate was stopped in February 2009. As a consequence the share of municipalities was reduced to 11.4%, whereas the central government's share increased to 9.6%. 4 Municipalities in Estonia also collect land tax and they have the right to enforce its rate between 1 to 2.5% on the land value basis. Many municipalities use the right to waive land tax on residential land owned by pensioners for their own use. Land tax in most cases makes up around 2 to 4% of total municipal revenues. Moreover Estonian municipalities have the right to establish local taxes, e.g. gambling tax, land tax, local sales tax, municipal boat tax, advertisement tax, tax for closing of streets, etc. Local taxes on average amount to less than 1% of municipal budgets in Estonia. For the fiscal equalization of Estonian municipalities and coverage of expenditure needs with revenues, the central government plays a leading role.
According to §154 of the Estonian Constitution, the municipalities which operate independently according to the law, decide and organise all elements of life in the local area. The same paragraph describes the basis for financing these functions as follows:
"municipalities can be obligated to fulfil tasks only via law or in agreement with the municipality. Expenses connected with tasks designated to the municipality by law will be financed from the state budget". So it is clear that the Estonian Constitution does not provide financial autonomy through an independent tax base for the municipalities. The §160 of the Estonian Constitution notes, "…the law will resolve management issues in the municipality and the supervision of its activities" (Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus 1992).
In the Law of Municipal Financial Management currently adopted by parliament, the Ministry of Finance follows the approach that says the state can intervene in municipal activities, including the prescription of ways how local issues should be managed (eletuskiri kohaliku omavalitsuse üksuse finantsjuhtimise seaduse 6 Deciding over the size of the equalization fund could be seen as a financial instrument for increasing the administrative power of the central government. Less than 10% of all local governments have sufficient self-revenues and they are not dependent on the central government's balancing support. The question arises whether such an equalization amount does not stimulate a municipal dependent mentality and weakens their own attempts for raising their own revenue (for instance supporting entrepreneurship development etc.). Therefore, the main weakness related to the fiscal stress in Estonia does not primarily concern the size of municipal expenditures -although this could be higher because of the needs for local infrastructure -but the fiscal equalization, the autonomy of municipalities and the regional dispersion of expenditures seem to be in a more serious situation. To reduce these regional divergences, to increase and protect the fiscal autonomy of municipalities, and also to decrease local government dependencies on political constellations in the central government, an improvement of the fiscal equalization system in Estonia appears to be necessary.
Guiding Principles for Changing Fiscal Equalization

The Connexity Principle
One group of principles that has to be introduced to stabilize the autonomy and The standard cost in the sense of central government should be determined in such a way that this solution is achieved. There is a danger that financial means given to the municipalities turn out to be rather small. As a consequence, other selfadministrative tasks of the municipalities get hindered or become unfeasible. Another solution would be to maximize the total utility (see the Diagram (b) of Figure 2 ). In this case the solution will be an activity level where the marginal total benefit becomes zero.
With a powerful central government the municipalities can still be kept on their minimum level path, however, the activity level (i.e. the task performance) as the maximum of total utility outcome is higher than that in the case of maximizing total utility minus the minimum utility of the municipalities -see Diagram (a) of Figure 2 .
Yet the gains between the central government and the municipalities have to be distributed through the definition of standard costs and payments to cover them. In the case of negotiations where the municipalities possess more power, a Nash solution maximizing the product of differences between utility and minimum utility of both partners will be achieved. We argued here in terms of the utility. However, the utility can be expressed differently according to individual goals (such as health, education, environment, transportation, safety, etc.), economic goals like employment, social goals, etc. (Eichhorn and Friedrich 1976 ). The models should be modified with respect to these various goals to be achieved. For example, the utility can be expressed by employment as a central government goal and ensuring minimum employment in a community as the local goal.
There may also be a bundle of goals including political ones where the result depends on different mixes of the goals as well leading to quite different compensations. An indicator of social welfare like net-benefit may be used as well, encountering the difficulty that a nationwide social welfare differs from the local welfare of the citizens of a municipality.
The financial means to compensate municipalities' expenditures related to their activities should ideally be transferred through conditional grants. Funding these functions by block grants, which all Estonian municipalities do not receive, should be limited. Some municipalities would be excluded from the compensation according to 11 The inclusion of 'people in palliative care' to the expenditure need indicators in Estonia since 2006 is related to the fact that the responsibility for this task was handed over from the central government to the municipalities and the equalization fund was increased. Two problems emerged, however. Firstly, for those municipalities not receiving a share of the equalization fund, their legitimate right to obtain extra financial means for an additional task is being violated. Secondly, resources intended to fulfill a certain task cannot be connected with the equalization fund principle.
The Principle of Parallelism
The Again for the municipalities, tax revenues consist of their own resources as well as revenues from concessions. Dividends of municipal enterprises can be included in the own resource criteria, too. Payments of sanctions to the municipalities increase also the own fiscal resources. Unlike the conditional grants, the block, unconditional grants increase the own financial revenues. Revenues from fees, public debt and property sale should be excluded as already mentioned above. Donations by private individuals that are not related to the additional municipal expenses can be added, too. If they are linked to additional expenses, e.g. construction or renewal of a building to host an art collection, the net fiscal inflow may also be added.
In Estonia a formula for the intergovernmental fiscal equalization exists already.
The formula for calculating the amount of the down-flow subsidy (Tn) aimed at supporting the achievement of local governments balance can be expressed as the difference between the normative revenue and the expenditure levels:
where:
• an means the normative level of revenues from personal income tax, land tax and charges for the use of natural resources that go to the budget of a local government unit in a given budget year 12 ;
• ak denotes the level of normatively calculated demand for payments (costs) of a municipal budget in a given fiscal year 13 ; and 12 The normative municipal revenue level (i.e. the capacity indicator an) is the product of the following three local revenue data: (1) personal income tax receipts for the last three years, which is multiplied by the income tax accounting growth rate coefficient (i.e. two thirds of the average coefficient of income tax growth for the last two years); (2) accounting land tax sum, using the land tax rate of 1.25% (the municipality can establish the land tax rate within a range between 1 to 2.5%); and (3) prognosis of received charges for the use of natural resources.
• 0.9 indicates that block grants have to cover 90% of the difference between the normative revenues and normative expenditures.
The calculation of the normative expenditure demand in municipalities involves a process of harmonizing two dimensions. On the one side, the forecasted level of municipal revenue from taxes and charges on the use of natural resources is found using the above mentioned self-revenue sources. On the other side, negotiations between the central government and the municipalities result in a political decision reflected in the State Budget Law about the size of equalization fund which is designed to help reduce municipal and town budget deficits in the corresponding budget year.
For the individual municipalities the calculated normative revenues are firstly compared to the normative expenditure needs, and then the negative results (i.e. the revenue deficits) are added together for all municipalities suffering from the fiscal stress. The total sum of municipal revenue deficits will be then multiplied by the factor 0.9 and the outcome of this computation should be the same as the sum of the equalization fund politically set. Formally expressed, the revenue deficits for covering the normative costs of all rural municipalities and towns are compensated via the central government grants by exactly 90%. Table 2 (1) the number of 0-6 years old children; (2) the number of 7-18 years old children; (3) the number of 19-64 years old workforce; (4) the number of 65 years old and older; (5) the length of roads (streets in km); and (6) the number of people in palliative care. 14 When using the equalization fund to cover 90% of the municipal or town normative revenue deficit, the task of unifying the financing for public sector services is fulfilled quite well. Assume that there are two municipalities and the normative revenues of the first municipality cover 90% of the normative expenditure demand whereas the coverage share amounts to 50% for the second municipality. By the given 90% equalization coefficient, the first one gets 9% compensation from the equalization fund and the other gets 45% of the normative expenditure demand. After such an adjustment, the coverage rate of the normative expenditures increases to 99% for the first municipality and to 95% for the second. The parallelism has not yet been considered in Estonian fiscal equalization system because: (1) the total sum of block grants determined annually has been the result of political decision of parliament about the state budget; and (2) the central government has changed the relations of the expenditure coefficients and, by doing so, also the expenditure level assessment of the individual municipalities. 
The size of parallelism can be expressed by
The rearrangement of equation (1) The first attempt refers to the year 1997 as a base year. Column (3) of Table 3 
For the total sum of block grants must hold:
For the municipality i we obtain:
We may introduce the parallelism according to equation (4):
As is the case with the existing system, the cost coefficient and the total fund sum for block grants are determined in this context. The relation of cost coefficients -not their absolute values -should be fixed and the block grants funds should underlie the parallelism. Then the amount of block grants for a municipality is determined by its own indicator structure, the total block grant funds, the need indicators of other municipalities, the sum of all fiscal indicators and its own fiscal capacity indicator. The cost coefficients vary, but the relation between them remains unchanged. Factor 0.9 is given. Therefore, all municipalities in financial need get the same percentage of normative budget deficit equalized.
Consequences for Local Fiscal Equalization in Estonia
There are several principal implications of the parallelism as a measure to strengthen the fiscal autonomy of municipalities. The parallelism is based on the idea that the assignment of tasks between central government and municipalities should be stable or is expected to be stable. Estonia has to overcome difficulties as the public sector is still in a transformation process. The wish to provide the municipalities with a high autonomy degree conflicts with the practical experience in the country where politicians like to lead and manage its economy and public sector in terms of ad hoc intervention.
Therefore, some changes in task performance of municipalities are caused by the fiscal 24 interference of the central government. This would be reduced if a certain level of stable parallelism constant exists. One also has to admit that a small country has to cope more often with political, economic and social crises, epidemics, etc. and reactions to them that cannot be much controlled because the causes of such developments are originated abroad.
Moreover, there are political, economic and public management goal conflicts among the central government and the municipalities. A mechanism must be formulated for checking and changing the parallelism. A solution might concern a corridor of change by stipulating the upper and lower levels in the constitution. A negotiation procedure might be installed that leads to a Nash solution in a commission where
Estonian municipalities have half of the seats and a voting power which equals that of the central government. The commission has to find a solution within a specified time scope. A referee solution should be foreseen if the commission does not come to terms.
For constitutionally fixed (rather rare) cases an emergency procedure may be installed.
If such institutional solutions are not available, a parallelism constant might be found for a year where the fiscal stress for central government and municipalities was relatively low. In other words, for that year the own revenues for central government and for municipalities should be determined as the so-called benchmarks.
A further problem implies surrounding the ways to fix the specified grants. They should follow the connexity principle and assist the municipalities with respect to investment and municipality tasks which should have the priorities for the entire public sector. However, they should not sweep out the block grants and by this way skip the parallelism. In addition total minimum amounts of block grants should be fixed. A similar institutional arrangement as stated above might be helpful also in this case. In this way public tasks for which the central government and Estonian municipalities have to perform together can be considered, which include, for example, regional planning, large infrastructure provision etc. 
